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Abstract—We present an overview of robust and resilient social
media tools to overcome natural disasters, censorship and
Internet kill switches. These social media tools use Android
devices to communicate during disasters and aim to overcome
attacks on freedom of expression. There is an abundance of
projects that aim to provide resilient communication, enhance
privacy, and provide anonymity. We focus specifically on the
limited set of mature tools with a healthy development com-
munity and Internet-deployment.
Index Terms—social media, privacy, anonymity
1. Introduction
Social media has become a widespread phenomenon of
local, national and global communication between people.
This free human communication via social media is un-
der threat of blackouts and far-reaching censorship. Recent
natural disasters have wiped out vital communication in-
frastructure for a prolonged period of time [1] or caused a
system overload due to the way the network is structured
with central bottlenecks that are also a single point of failure
[2]. Communication networks can also be unreliable due
to a suddenly unstable power grid [3] or permanent power
shortages [4].
Censorship can be effectuated in such a way that it
resembles partial network failures [5] or a total blackout [6]
with an Internet kill switch [7]. A constant battle is fought
over tools that counter a specific censorship mechanism and
vice versa [8]. State actors are involved in what seems to be
a direct battle between them and the open source community
providing activists with the tools they need [9].
Mobile phones can be considered autonomous plat-
forms thanks to wireless ad hoc connections and on board
rechargeable batteries [10]. The smart phone app phe-
nomenon has been used as an angle to counter disruptions
in communications due to natural disasters or human made
interference [11]. This recently prompted even more aggres-
sive censorship measures behind the Great Firewall of China
[12].
Problem Description
This survey lists field proven solutions that provide a
robust and resilient social media experience on Android, one
of the most popular mobile platforms, considering privacy
and anonymity. The threat model assumed is the following:
[13]
• The adversary can observe, block, delay, replay, and
modify traffic on all underlying transport. Thus, the
physical layer is insecure.
• The adversary has a limited ability to compromise
smart phones or other participating devices. If a
device is compromised, the adversary can access any
information held in the devices´ volatile memory or
persistent storage.
• The adversary cannot break standard cryptographic
primitives, such as block ciphers and message-
authentication codes.
2. The Twimight Ad Hoc Network
Twimight uses opportunistic ad hoc communication and
the store and forward principle to distribute tweets amoung
users with the same Twimight app in ’disaster mode’. [14] In
normal mode it behaves just like a regular Twitter app autho-
rized by the user with OAuth. In disaster mode Twimight
tries to spread tweets epidemically and publicly to every
peer within reach, flooding the network. Switching to this
disaster mode enables Bluetooth to periodically scan for
other devices, also running the Twimight app in disaster
mode, while continuously listening to answer connection
requests from other devices. Upon finding a peer the Blue-
tooth connection is automatically setup and ’disaster tweets’
are exchanged.
The Twimight Disaster Server (TDS) is a central compo-
nent in the system that signs a certificate for each Twimight
user. This certificate is used to sign disaster tweets for
integrity checks and author authentication, as well as to
encrypt private direct messages between clients. The lifetime
of each certificate is limited to only 14 days to keep the
certificate revocation list embedded in the Twimight app
short. [14]
To prevent expiration of a certificate just before a disas-
ter happens the clients update their keys and request a new
certificate from the TDS after 7 days. If the duration of a
disaster is more than 7 days the authors of Twimight expect
an alternative infrastructure to be available at that time to
access the Internet. [14]
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New users can not join the network during a disaster
because it is impossible to use the disaster mode without
a TDS signed certificate. The TDS is the only allowed
certificate authority by the Twimight app and all invalid
tweets are discarded. The TDS root certificate is embedded
in the Twimight app for validation of every certificate that is
used to sign a tweet. To update the root certificate requires
the Twimight app to be updated. [14]
To control spam the maximum of tweets exchanged is
500 of which at most 250 are from the peer itself and the rest
relayed from others. It is expected of the user to moderate
the amount of their own tweets and to retweet only relevant
information. There is no integrated resource management
strategy in case this buffer gets full. [14]
If Internet connectivity is regained only the user’s own
disaster tweets are uploaded to the Twitter server [14]. In
order for a disaster tweet of a user that may still be in harm’s
way to reach the Internet requires a retweet from a user with
Internet connection. Twimight is not able to check if the
disaster tweet from another user is already published and
Figure 1. The Twimight home screen.
cannot decide to publish this tweet on behalf of this user,
who is apparently still without Internet connection, and who
possibly remains in harm’s way.
The opportunistic network approach requires continuous
scanning for connection opportunities. A shorter interval
of 1 minute versus 2 minutes using Bluetooth severely
degrades battery life. A larger interval may result in missed
connection opportunities and resulting consequences in the
context of a disaster.
3. The Serval Mesh Network
The Serval Project created mesh network software to
provide communication services without the need for fixed
infrastructure. Smart phones equipped with WiFi and the
Serval Mesh app for Android allow voice calls to be made
over the mesh network as well as text messaging and
file sharing. Within any mobile network the clients can
physically change location and therefore change location
in the network. Particularly in mesh networks there is no
Figure 2. The Serval home screen.
central directory to register the new location of a client,
and the network itself may change in addition to that,
making routing even more complex. To connect to a specific
user requires knowing their phone number and asking all
neighboring phone in the mesh network to find the address
of the phone on the network. The Mesh Datagram Protocol
(MDP) in the network layer propagates these requests over
the network for a limited time and returns the addresses
of any phone that claims to own that phone number. It is
impossible to verify these claims without prior knowledge
of the public key of the callee so it is left up to the user
to choose the right result, without knowing if the intended
receiver was actually reached by the request at all. Each
user can claim their own phone number on the mesh without
any checks and generate their own public-private key pair
with elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). The public key is
used as unique subscriber identifier or Serval Identity (SID)
and both keys are stored on the device and hidden using
steganography for plausible deniability [15]. Only after the
first contact a certificate can be issued by the caller to the
callee to affirm their identity and build a trust network. Be-
fore knowing the public key of the intended receiver anyone
in between the connection can impersonate and eavesdrop
on the conversation. A man-in-the-middle attack is generally
very difficult to defeat in a mesh network because often no
trusted third party can be contacted to verify the validity of
a certificate.
Another pitfall of mesh networks is the usual high
end-to-end packet loss. To reduce but not guarantee no
end-to-end packet loss MDP uses per-hop retransmission
which restores otherwise unusable routes and provides better
packet delivery rates than conventional UDP over a multi-
hop wireless network. MDP also allows for packets to
be signed and encrypted so upper layers don’t have to.
Directly above the network layer is the voice call session and
audio carrier protocol called the Voice over Mesh Protocol
(VoMP). VoMP is more suitable for mesh networks as it does
not assume stable virtual circuits over static routes, like SIP
and RTP do. Since MDP does not offer reliable messaging
VoMP is designed to handle packet loss, mid-call re-routing
and re-connection where SIP would fail. [16]
The resilient file distribution system Rhizome is used
for file sharing. Rhizome uses the store and forward prin-
ciple and is therefore suitable for mesh networks, but only
guarantees the integrity of the file and not eventual arrival.
The best effort transport of files is prioritized according to
network topology, bandwidth and device storage and battery
availability, but otherwise it preserves net neutrality. Anony-
mous file sharing is possible by not storing any information
on the senders so they can not be traced. [15] The messaging
service MeshMS is build upon Rhizome by sharing two
journal files per interlocutor, one for incoming and one for
outgoing messages.
To overcome the scalability limitations of mesh networks
with link tracking, like the Serval Mesh, route aggregation
is necessary beyond the point of all bandwidth being used
for link tracking. Network prefixes based on physical or
topological location are proposed as well as making the net-
work interoperable with infrastructure like the Commotion
wireless network [17]. Any device that does not know its
own location can clone a nearby network prefix and provide
a coarse location service. Anonymity however suffers from
this approach.
4. The Psiphon Proxy & VPN Service
Psiphon is a proxy client and server tool originally made
in 2006 by the Citizen Lab in the OpenNet Initiative and
now developed by Psiphon Inc. It is used in more than 40
countries where Internet is censored in some way [18]. The
tool allows users to circumvent censorship by connecting to
a proxy server outside of the censor’s network and create
an encrypted tunnel through which the rest of the Internet
can be accessed. Psiphon uses the socket secure (SOCKS)
and Secure Shell (SSH) protocol and virtual private network
(VPN) to implement the secure tunnel as well as HTTP
proxy technology. These protocols provide an encrypted
end-to-end tunnel that prevents the censor from knowing
Figure 3. The Psiphon home screen.
the contents of the communication providing some privacy.
An obfuscation layer can be added on top of SSH in an
attempt to circumvent deep packet inspection (DPI) that can
recognize the type of traffic and block it regardless of its
content and destination. The tunnel goes straight from the
client to the proxy server and no effort is made to hide
the client’s IP address, so Psiphon does not provide any
anonymity at all. This important dissent feature is deemed
out of scope [19].
Keeping Psiphon operational requires new proxy servers
to be available at the same rate or quicker than used proxy
servers are blocked. If the censor gets ahead in this cat-
and-mouse game the Psiphon client will no longer able to
connect to any proxy server and is forced to find another
source for addresses of non-blocked proxy servers in the
future. Domain fronting is used to hide the true destination
of an HTTPS request by putting a fake front domain in
the DNS query and in the TLS Server Name Indication
(SNI) extension, and the real one in the HTTP Host header
[20]. Using content delivery networks (CDN) to host the
domain of the proxy server is an attempt to make the cost
of blocking Psiphon together with the entire CDN too high
for the censor. Accessing the proxy by IP directly, like
domainless fronting, leaves the option of blocking the IP
address, and with it all domains and services behind it. The
amount of available addresses is limited and will eventually
deplete the remaining stack of IPv4 addresses. Psiphon is
IPv6 compatible but the censor can block these addresses
just as easily when the censoring tools are IPv6 compatible
as well.
Psiphon is vulnerable to an insider attack because the
censor can use the tool itself to discover all non-blocked
proxy servers and subsequently block them. Various strate-
gies based on software build ID, date, and time of day, are
used for publishing a limited amount of servers to a single
client to mitigate this risk of an insider attack. The idea
of tracking which clients know about which servers to find
traitors was rejected because that requires tracking with an
unique client ID [21].
Certificates are used to verify the authenticity of the
clients and servers. Proxy servers are authenticated by the
client automatically with embedded certificates in the soft-
ware to make it hard for the censor to perform a man-
in-the-middle attack. Because authenticating the client is a
manual process that requires some technical knowledge it
undermines the security of the embedded server certificates.
A malicious repackaged version of Psiphon surfaced in
2014, that was likely part of a targeted attack by actors
in Syria, installed a remote access tool (RAT) and key
logger [22]. Psiphon Inc. is a commercial company and
it collects and sells the metadata of its users, for example
which sites are visited from which countries and how often
[23]. This logging may concern anyone that uses Psiphon
to circumvent censorship if the act of doing so is illegal.
Also the company allows sponsors to automatically open a
website in the user’s browser after a tunneled connection is
established which makes a individual user traceable.
5. Orbot Onion Routing Service
The second generation onion router (Tor) is a circuit-
based privacy-enhancing communication service [24]. The
distributed overlay network Tor creates is designed to
anonymize TCP-based applications like web browsing. Or-
web is such a web browser and uses the Orbot app as the
Tor client software. Tor clients build temporary circuits from
available relay routers that are found in a Tor directory
server. A typical circuit has a fixed length of three differ-
ent nodes: 1. entry node 2. relay node 3. exit node. The
initiator chooses which nodes to use and creates a tunnel
through each, ending up with three layers of encryption.
The nodes only know their direct neighbor in the circuit,
so operate anonymously beyond their direct neighbor, and
are not supposed to log this information to enhance privacy.
Anonymity outside of the Tor network is the result of the exit
node connecting outside of the Tor network on behalf of the
initiator. From the exit node onwards the connection is no
longer secured by Tor. To prevent abuse not every exit node
Figure 4. The Orbot home screen.
allows all traffic and all destinations and some only connect
to a private network. To achieve low latency the initiator
makes use of the advertised available bandwidth for a relay
router to do load balancing. [25] Perfect forward secrecy
is achieved by negotiating session keys for each successive
hop in the circuit.
The directory server is a central component in the Tor
network and is the authority of the list of relays that make
up the Tor network. Only 10 directory servers are currently
in existence and all the addresses are hard coded into the Tor
Browser Bundle. The directory server must approve every
new onion router and must be trusted by all its users. Bridge
relays however are not listed in the main Tor directory
making it difficult for a censor to block all known Tor
relays. Limited amount of bridge addresses are provided
upon manual user request by the bridge authority via email
[26]. Obfuscation protocols are used to connect to the first
Tor relay and constantly improved to stay ahead of the deep
packet inspection of censoring ISPs.
Inside its network Tor offers location-hidden TCP-
services, like a web server. The service provider can stay
anonymous by creating circuits to multiple introduction
points that can be contacted by potential users of the service.
The user collects the onion identifier of the hidden service
and create its own circuit to the introduction point as well
as a separate circuit to another relay router that acts as a
rendezvous point. The hidden service learns of the user’s
request from its introduction point and connects via another
circuit to the rendezvous point where the two circuits are
mated. Various attacks [27] [28] sometimes involve just
one malicious node to compromise anonymity of a hidden
service within minutes or hours [29]. An active attacker can
always try to analyze the timing and volume of traffic going
in and out of the relay to de-anonymize its target due to
the low-latency design of the Tor network. [30] To counter
this attack angle a relay that is deemed reliable in terms
of uptime and capable in terms of bandwidth availability
receives the Guard flag. A small subset of guard nodes
are selected by a Tor client for a longer period of time to
choose entry nodes from. If an adversary is not in this subset
of entry guards it prevents the adversary from eventually
becoming the first relay in the circuit after frustrating the
circuit building process of the Tor client. This gives the Tor
user a chance to not be observed from the first relay, that
is the only relay that knows the true origin. Although guard
nodes are supposed to guard against path disruption attacks,
they are themselves vulnerable to attack [25].
6. The Tribler Family
Tribler is a fully decentralized peer-to-peer social shar-
ing app that aims to provide a Youtube-like video consuming
experience with an integrated multimedia player. On the
desktop Tribler is a single application which runs on all three
major platforms, but on Android the core components and
interface are not yet well integrated. On the mobile platform
the Tribler family of apps offer additional privacy enhancing
features, viral spreading and mutation from source code.
The two authors of this survey are doing their thesis
work on Tribler and founded Tribler respectively.
6.1. Tribler Play
The Tribler Play app consists of a native Android Java
GUI, VLC for Android player and Python for Android to
run Tribler underneath. [31]
Tribler is capable of distributed streaming of real-time
HD video and efficiently adapt to network conditions [32],
[33]. It is based upon and compatible with the BitTorrent
protocol, but without the need for any central component in
the system, like trackers or websites. Search functionality
is integrated into the app by the elastic database Dispersy.
Content is announced on channels, just like Youtube, and
each user can create one. Tribler uses three specific Dis-
persy communities to distribute torrent files and thereby
replace the typical BitTorrent websites: AllChannelCom-
munity, SearchCommunity and MetadataCommunity. Deep
knowledge and performance analysis of the BitTorrent pro-
Figure 5. The Tribler Play home screen while starting a stream.
tocol generated insights for improvements that were applied
in Tribler [34], [35], [36], [37]. For instance, timely and
accurate knowledge of the geographical location of peers
in the network can increase the transfer speed significantly
[38]. In order to propagate and store metadata a gossip type
protocol is used [39], [40]. A study of the top-10 Youtube
content creators indicate that essential features for effective
platforms for peer production are: separation of good and
bad contributions, regulation of computer resources, group
communication, and community building [41].
Building upon social relationships Tribler gives content
recommendations to the user automatically based on the
preferences of friends and people with similar interests and
improves these suggestions even without interaction [42],
[43]. Self-organizing collaborative filtering can improve
these recommendations even without interaction [44], [45],
[46], [47], [48]
Free-riding can not be prevented if more than half the
peers are behind a firewall, since they are unable to respond
to incoming connections [49]. Therefore to be able to pro-
vide a reasonable quality of service for fair users, free-riders
in the system are penalized as long as upload bandwidth in
the swarm is scarce [50]. A distinction is made between
lazy free-riders and die-hard free-riders, the latter of which
cheats the protocol [51].
Tribler correlates multiple overlay networks to charac-
terize the behavior of real users [52]. For example, com-
munities of users with similar interests can be exploited to
automatically build a robust semantic and social overlay to
increase usability and download performance significantly
by collaborative downloading [53], [54]. The social network
can also increase trust and give an incentive to exchange
content which increases content availability [48]. Since co-
operation is hard to enforce Tribler uses psychology theory
for inducing it by showing the similarity between users,
making behavior publicly visible, making it possible for
users to express approval or disapproval about each other,
allowing different return-on-investment times for different
relationship types, showing how much others contribute in
respect to their total resources, exploiting the need to belong,
and make groups small, powerful and exclusive, allowing
users to stand out of the crowd, displaying information
on friendship and the degrees of separation, letting users
specialize in one of the four aspects of cooperation, keeping
track of the given help/received help ratio, making infor-
mation about a group and its members visible, and finally,
making users feel intrinsically motivated to cooperate [55],
[56]. A user is more induced to reciprocity over time if the
action is directed at one person rather than whole community
as a whole [57]. Effective reciprocal relationships can most
likely be found within first or second degrees of separation,
whereas relationships of higher degrees are not as flexible
over time, thus benefiting most from immediate reciprocity.
[58]
6.2. Android Tor Tribler Tunneling (AT3)
Android Tor Tribler Tunneling (AT3) is a research proto-
type that proves the feasibility of using anonymous tunnels
on an Android device through which Tribler can offer its
services to the user as long as the Android device supports
hardware accelerated cryptography or encryption is disabled.
AT3 is the sibling of Tribler Play, both use Python for
Android to run the Tribler core and an Android port of the
BitTorrent library (libtorrent), and the apps together offer
the same functionality as the Tribler desktop application.
[59]
The Tor-like anonymity network is very similar to plain
Tor, however it is a separate network and allows multiple
circuits at the same time to be aggregated to increase down-
load speed. The app anonymously downloads a torrent of 50
MB over 1-3 hops and 1-3 circuits while measuring CPU
usage and download speed, averaging 450-650 KB/s [59].
The regular BitTorrent protocol on top of plain Tor leaks
information and becomes more vulnerable to traffic moni-
toring and communications’ hijacking [60]. Tribler however
eliminated the tracker that would normally reveal the true
IP addresses of its users, thus Tribler now combines the best
of both worlds.
Figure 6. The Android Tor Tribler Tunneling home screen.
6.3. Shadow Internet
The Shadow Internet app currently integrates a video
recording feature, NFC+Bluetooth wireless app & file trans-
fer feature with the Tribler search and download features.
The entire app, including the interface, are written in Python,
supported by Python for Android. [61]
Android smart phones that are equipped with a Near
Field Communication (NFC) chip can use this to auto-
matically setup a Bluetooth large file transfer with the
Android Beam feature. The Shadow Internet app can trans-
fer the videos made with the phone as well as the app
itself. Leveraging the ease of use and power efficiency of
NFC+Bluetooth transfers the smart phone is turned into
a node of an ad hoc network wherever Internet is not
available. When Internet is available the app would use the
Tribler network to seed the video, but is currently not yet
implemented.
In the use case of eye witness of government misbehav-
ior the app would allow the user to record and share the
evidence anonymously directly from the Shadow Internet
app. Spreading the data as fast as possible and possibly
getting it out of the government controlled region is key
for the evidence to come to light.
Another use case is the festival fanatic who records a
video of the experience and wants to instantly share it with
friends in an extremely busy area or an area without Internet
access. In both instances the wireless NFC+Bluetooth trans-
fer allows the user to share the content to anyone without
the app even. If a WiFi connection is available the Tribler
protocol would publish and distribute the video effectively
via the users’ channel.
6.4. DroidStealth
The DroidStealth app has a morphing capabilities, cryp-
tography containers and can hide traces of usage of itself
on the phone. The app acts like a vault in which content
Figure 7. The Shadow Internet home screen with video context menu.
can be securely saved thanks to encryption. Just like the
Shadow Internet app [61] it also features a video camera
recorder and on top of that a voice and photo capture feature.
[63], [64] The user interface is very intuitive thanks to an
icon and color indication of which content is currently (not)
encrypted, and simply tapping to toggle the status. The most
impressive features are the hiding capabilities that do not
require special permissions on the device: morphing the icon
and name to something inconspicuous, the hidden launchers,
and automatic removal of traces of usage.
The app can be secretly launched by typing a user
configured pin-code into phone dialer or with an invisible
widget. The fake phone number won’t be called and won’t
show up in the recent called list. After switching to another
app or the desktop DroidStealth is no longer present in the
recent app carousel.
The morphing is achieved through unpacking the An-
droid Application Package (.apk) and modifying the binary
xml files and icon.png, then repackaging and signing with
an embedded key. The morphed app can then be shared with
Figure 8. The DroidStealth home screen with content.
Name Age Last Commits LOC # Contributers # Open # Open Min. Android # Installations
Release Pull Requests Issues Version
Psiphon 9 y nov ‘15 6 K 363 K 29 4 174 2.2+ 10.000.000 - 50.000.000
Tor 13 y oct ‘14 46 K 435 K 287 - 2425 2.2+ 5.000.000 - 10.000.000
Tribler 10 y jan ‘15 15 K 166 K 72 8 186 4.0+ 1.000.000 - 5.000.000
Serval 11 y jul ‘15 12 K 420 K 120 8 17 2.2+ 100.000 - 500.000
Twimight 4 y sep ‘14 0.5 K 24 K 6 - 9 4.0+ 5.000 - 10.000
TABLE 1. COMPARING PROJECTS [62].
others via NFC+Bluetooth just like the Shadow Internet app
[61].
Any adversary that performs a casual check on the phone
will not notice a calculator or another similarly innocuous
app. All suspect traces of usage are removed automatically
by the app and it can superficially look like any other app
with extreme ease.
6.5. SelfCompileApp
The SelfCompileApp is the first autonomous app that
is capable of self-compilation, mutation and viral spreading
[11]. It does not require a host computer to alter its function-
ality or change its appearance, and no special permissions on
the device. It also does not need to be distributed through an
app store or website because it has the same NFC+Bluetooth
transfer feature as DroidStealth [63]. It has all the required
Android SDK build tools embedded and a Java key store
with the default android debug key to sign the Android
Application Package (.apk). The source code, resources and
libraries are extracted on the SD card accessible to the user
who can then modify the app manually or only use the GUI
of the app that allows the icon, name, package, colors and
theme to be modified.
Any content added to the assets folder on the SD card
can be embedded in the app just like the Java key store.
Combined with the wireless transfer capabilities the app be-
comes effectively a morphing container that can mutate and
virally spread without the need for Internet, thus overcoming
Internet kill switches and disruptions due to natural disasters
or man made interference.
7. Conclusions
We presented a wide range of Android-based social
media tools for disaster communication, privacy, and over-
coming Internet kill switches.
No clear winner has emerged among the existing robust
social media tools. For numerous years various groups have
worked on differing approaches. No project has achieved
the maturity and popularity of the mainstream fragile so-
cial media tools based on a single profit-driven entity and
centralized architecture. Will any robust tool ever reach the
popularity of market leaders such as Twitter (300 million
monthly active users)?
Our survey indicates that it is unlikely that robustness
and resilience will become mainstream. Existing projects do
not seem to be on a sustainable trajectory for mainstream
uptake. The sad conclusions is that the underlying reasons
for a stark future are difficult to overcome. For instance,
lack of funding, lack of dedicated expert developers, highly
fragmented development effort, replication of effort instead
of software re-use, lack of usability testing, and minimal
user experience expertise.
Figure 9. The SelfCompileApp home screen.
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